Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 2 (1979) 155-193

© North-Holland Publishing Company
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I. Introduction
A long established principle underlying the American financial institutional
structure is that dealing in deposits (or commercial banking) and new-issue activities in nongovemment securities (or investment banking) must be carried on by
separate entities. The resultant prohibition against the entry of commercial banks
into the private securities business was an extreme policy when compared with the
policies of laissez-faire and discretionary regulation. However, it was the logical
outcome of the application of the "commercial loan" theory of banking [1] and
the unsettling experience of periodic bank failure, financial crises, and economic
downturns which were thought to occur whenever the separation principle was
ignored [2]. Financial losses by the public during periods of speculative excess were
attributed in large part to conflicts of interest that seemed inevitably to arise when
the banks engaged both in commercial banking and investment banking acitivities
[3].
The main embodiment of the separation principle is the National Banking Act
of 1933 [4], popularly called the Glass-Steagall Act. This statute maintains the
principle by means of restrictions on the permissible activities and affiliations of
both commercial and investment banks. Taken altogether, these restrictions underscore the Congressional intent to protect the financial resources of commercial
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banks and to ensure the impartiality of the investment advice given by commercial
banks to their customers.
Examination of the statute reveals that there are several types of securities activities that are neither specifically permitted to be engaged in by commercial banks
nor expressly disallowed to them. These activities, the subject matter of this paper,
fall into what we call a "twilight zone" of activities. Within this zone, commercial
banks have repeatedly sought means by which to increase their participation in the
securities industry. Currently, the most sought after means of entry are private
placement of corporate securities, sales of mutual funds participations, and underwriting of a broader set of state and municipal revenue bonds.
In the course of this paper we shall provide background material for the GlassSteagall Act and the several currently popular means of entry into the securities
business. We shall describe the relevant statutory restrictions upon commercial bank
security activity and the devices the banks have used to circumvent these restrictions. Finally, we shall evaluate the devices both in terms of their objective desirability and their chances of success. Our perspective will be policy oriented, and so
the analyses will focus upon policy issues.

2. Historical background of the National Banking Act of 1933
The Glass-Steagall Act is largely based upon the nineteenth-century English
banking system model. In that model, investment banking is considered an
inherently risky and speculative venture and thus, an improper business pursuit for
commercial banks, i.e. financial institutions entrusted with the savings of the general
public. Commercial banking is necessarily a conservative business, according to the
model, and investments should take the form of self-liquidating short-term loans

[51.
In contrast to the English model there is the German model. This alternative
model permits the conscious mix of both commercial and investment banking by a
single financial institution. The mix is permitted for two "reasons. First, greater
efficiency is achieved by the mix because the information needed and the decisionmaking skills required by financial institutions are similar whether the loans made
by the institutions are short-term (with continuous renewals) or long-term. Secondly, greater security for the institutions' asset portfolio is achieved by the mix
because the asset portfolio can then be diversified. In Germany, this mix has
resulted in the growth of a relatively small number of very large and broad-based
financial institutions with multipurpose branches throughout the country and
abroad [6].
The German model has been criticized in the United States on several grounds.
One ground has been that the vast power exercised by a small number of very large
multipurpose banks gives rise to fears of monopoly and concentration of economic
power. Another ground has been that an all-powerful east coast financial establish-
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ment would arise and disadvantage western and southern economic interests. Still
another ground has been that the banks would abuse their enormous economic
power to the detriment of individuals and the nation. These concerns have led some
states to prohibit any form of branch banking power. However, despite these concerns, there have been repeated attempts to move closer to the German model,
usually for reasons of efficiency [7]. Such attempts have been initiated by both
commercial banks and regulatory agencies and reflect a growing awareness that the
finance industry has itself gradually been moving closer to the German system. The
following describes how this has happened.
21. The emergence of trust companies
During the post-Civil War period, the American financial system began to move
toward the German system by means of the increased importance of trust companies. These trust companies were state chartered institutions with broad incorporation documents that permitted them to engage in virtually any type of financial
business activity. At first, the companies restricted their activities to management
of the estates and wills of wealthy individual customers. Service to the dead, however, soon led to service to the living and, before long, trust companies were
soliciting deposits in competition with strictly commercial banks. In addition, the
companies made financial counselling and assistance available to businesses as well
as to individuals. They dealt in securities in several ways. In some cases they acted
merely as selling agents for new-money issues of corporations. In other cases they
gave their approval to particular issues of securities and even promoted these
securities among potential investors. In still other cases they purchased securities
with funds held in trust, or with the companies' own funds [8].
By the beginning of the twentieth century, trust companies were widely recognized as department stores of finance. They succeeded in expanding into commercial/investment banking institutions because of broadly drafted incorporation
laws and also because of the absence of federal regulation of trust companies or
state chartered banks.
State banks experienced similar expansion of power when they demanded and
received broadened powers from the state legislatures. Thus, by the turn of the
century, state banks offered services similar to those offered by the trust companies,
although the precise legal distinction between the two sets of services was not the
same in any two states [9].
National banks were unable to prevent the gains made by the state banks and
sought means to regain competitive parity. Many chose to enter into the field of
investment banking directly.
2.2. Gompetitive retaliation:nationalbanks and investment banking
During the early decades of the twentieth century, financial firms that had
originally functioned as investment banking institutions began to broaden their
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range of activities. Private investment bankers that were involved in the development of railroads and huge industrial concentrations in the late nineteenth century
entered into the deposit banking business. They used deposit-type funds to meet
their need for the huge financial resources required to underwrite the securities of
growing industries. In order to market the securities they developed, they used subsidiary state chartered banks and trust companies.
By the beginning of the First World War there were no "effective market barriers
in law or custom" [10] to prohibit any financial institution from participation in
any form of commercial or investment banking activity. Expansion of state banks
induced the courts to interpret the implied powers of national banks so as to allow
them to invest in state, municipal, and corporate bonds. The United States
Comptroller of the Currency responded to these broad interpretations by altering
the portfolio regulations for the national banks accordingly. As investment in such
outstanding securities was increasingly permitted, it became impossible to prohibit
the underwriting of such securities, and so such underwriting became popular.
When the Comptroller of the Currency ruled that national banks could not underwrite stocks, the national banks began to create state chartered security affiliates.
As a result, national banks began to engage in underwriting activity free from the
constraints of federal laws and regulations. In 1913, largely on account of this trend
toward regulatory laxity, the Federal Reserve Act specifically conferred power
upon national banks to operate trust divisions.
Financial requirements of the federal government during the First World War
lent further impetus to the trend of regulatory laxity. The government's demand
for funds was huge and led to the utilization of state chartered commercial banks
for the underwriting of United States Treasury Department securities. This practice,
unrestrained by the federal government, caused national banks to believe that the
government had conferred implicit approval upon their efforts to increase and
expand their investment banking activities.
Following the First World War, banks that had been involved in the sale and
distribution of U.S. Treasury bonds retained their securities personnel and
redirected their new-issue efforts towards the private sector: This, in turn, influenced customers' investment behavior. They became less afraid to invest in the
private sector when the same bond salesman told them that the postwar, nongovernment securities were safe and yielded greater returns than had the wartime
bonds. In addition, changes occurred at the other end of the finance market as
corporations, discovering public acceptance of-their new security issues, switched
from repeated short-term credit. into permanent financing. Consequently, commercial banks earned less and less from their short-term loan portfolios and were
compelled to look elsewhere for income. The securities market was where the
action seemed to be, and so they sought to enter more deeply into the investment
banking business.
Passage of the National Banking Act of 1927, popularly called the McFadden
Act, served to endorse commercial banks' activities in the securities business.
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Although the main purpose of the Act was to liberalize the branching powers of
national banks, it also formally affirmed the authority of commercial banks to
underwrite securities through their securities affiliates. Regulatory control over
such activities was conferred by the Act upon the Comptroller of the Currency
[I I]. At first, the Comptroller permitted the underwriting of debt securities only;
later he permitted the underwriting of stocks as well.
Thus, both state and nationally chartered commercial banks became the "dominant force in investment banking". Owing to the loosening of regulatory constraints
and the booming securities markets of the late 1920s, these banks increased their
share of securities underwritings dramatically. Between 1927 and 1930, for
example, they nearly doubled their participation in bond underwriting activity,
from 37 to 61 percent [12].
2.3. The Great Depressionand passage of the NationalBanking Act of 1933
The commercial bank practice of engaging in securities activities by means of
security affiliates came under sharp attack during the years of the Great Depression. The failure of the Bank of the United States in December 1930 was attributed
to speculative excesses of management operating through a security affiliate. The
final majority report of the Pecora Committee, released in 1934, revealed that
deceptive, fraudulent, and manipulative practices were widespread in the securities
activities of commercial banks. Disclosure by banks to investors concerning the
securities being sold was minimal at best, and was often misleading or deceptive.
The committee also raised questions about the propriety of interlocking personnel
relationships, an issue argued some twenty years earlier by the Pujo Committee
[13].
As a result of thousands of bank failures and hundreds of security brokerldealer
bankruptcies, the incoming Roosevelt Administration encouraged a burst of legislative action that remains basically intact to this day. In 1933 Congress enacted two
bills, the National Banking Act, or Glass-Steagall Act, and the Securities Act. The
former protected commercial bank depositors by (a) organizing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, (b) divorcing commercial banking institutions from investment banking institutions, (c) restricting bank credit extensions for speculation, (d)
restricting branch banking and group banking, and (e) regulating the interest paid
on savings deposits. The latter act protected investors and commercial bank
depositors by'(a) establishing the principles of full and public disclosure to the
investors and potential investors of information concerning the companies whose
securities they may purchase, (b) including an antifraud provision aimed at curbing
speculative excesses in new issues, and (c) conferring power upon the Federal
Reserve Board to regulate the extension of bank credit on margin to securities purchasers. Together, the two Acts aimed at curbing speculative trends in the securities
markets.
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3. The National Banking Act of 1933
The National Banking Act of 1933, most widely known as the Glass-Steagall
Act, is currently the most far-reaching federal statute on the subject of commercial
bank securities activities. In none of its pertinent sections however does it use the
term "commercial bank". Rather, it distinguishes between financial institutidns
that engage in either of two types of activity: receipt of deposits "subject to check
or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor" or issuance, underwriting, sale
or distribution "at wholesale or retail; or through syndicate participation [of]
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities" [14]. Since these types of activity are commonly held to constitute the commercial banking business and the
investment banking business, respectively, the Glass-Steagall Act has come to be
known for its insistence that the two types of banking business be engaged in by completely separate and independently operated banking entities. The following two
subsections illustrate exactly how the Act achieves this separation.
3.1. Commercialbank restrictions
The two pertinent sections of the Act are sections 16 and 20. Section 16 [15]
limits the extent to which a national bank - a bank subject to the requirements of
the Federal Reserve Act - can deal in and underwrite securities or stock. Dealing is
limited to the purchase and sale of securities and stock "without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account". Exception is made for so-called "investment securities" under statutory
limitations and "under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the
Currency may by regulation prescribe". Underwriting is prohibited, except vis-a-vis
certain types of securities, such as "obligations of the United States, or general
obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof".
Section 20 [16] limits the extent to which a member bank, Le. one which is a
member of the Federal Reserve system, can be affiliated with an organization that
deals in securities. It prohibits any such affiliation if it occurs in any of the four
forms described in the statute [17].
3.2. Investment bank restrictions

The two pertinent sections of the Act are sections 21 and 32. Section 21 [181
makes it unlawful for any individual or organization engaged in the securities business "to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of' commercial banking. Section 32 [19] limits the extent to which there can be interlocking personnel between commercial and investment banks. No officer, director,
partner, or employee of an investment banking organization, and no individual
"primarily engaged" in the securities business can "serve at the same time as an
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officer, director, or employee of any member bank". However, exception is made
"in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System may allow such service ...when in [its] judgment ...it would not unduly
influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its
customers regarding investments".
3.3. Twilight zone of commercial bank securities activities
As is evident from the foregoing description of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks are not prohibited from engaging in all investment banking, or
securities activities. An illustration of this is found in section 16, which expressly
permits purchase and sale of securities and stock on customer order and also allows
underwriting of general obligation government securities. In conjunction with these
activities, commercial banks are also permitted to render financial advice.
However, there is a whole range of securities activities that is neither prohibited
by nor expressly permitted by the Act. These activities, described and analyzed
later in this paper, comprise the twilight zone of commercial bank securities activites.

4. Historical background of the current attempts by commercial banks to expand
and increase their securities activities
During the approximately twenty-five years that followed passage of the GlassSteagall Act, commercial banks were content to be the conservative, slow growth
giants of the American financial markets. Opportunities in traditional commercial
banking activities were plentiful, the consumer credit business was expanding, and
banks were busy updating their internal modes of operation. However, changes
began to occur in the late 1950s and 1960s and commercial banks no longer were
content to be sleeping giants.
4.1. New management style in banking
During the 1950s a significant change occurred in the style of management of
large national commercial banks. The traditional old-boy style was replaced by the
new MBA style. Bank executives who traditionally focused upon custom, friendships, and college ties when granting loans were replaced by bank executives whose
primary criterion was whether the loan would be profitable for the bank. To some
extent this change was not entirely voluntary, since it often was forced upon the
banks by their corporate clients who themselves were undergoing dramatic internal
changes. Commercial bank customers began to view their relationship with the bank
differently too. They began to ask whether better service in certain areas could be
gotten from other types of financial institutions.
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4.2. Competitionfrom foreign banks and other types offinancialinstitutions
As traditional business activity, i.e. demand deposits and business loans
slackened, competition from both within and without the banking industry
increased. Foreign banks increased their activities in the United States. Other types
of financial institutions, such as investment banks, investment companies, and
broker/dealers organizations, expanded their range of operations and provided
highly desirable services that commercial banks were unprepared, or not permitted,
to provide.
4.3. Regulatory climate conducive to the formation of bank holding companies
Commercial banks first used bank holding companies in order to form multibank
corporations. This structure enabled them to expand the scale of their traditional
banking operations and to circumvent some of the state laws restricting multibranch banking. Later, positions taken by the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board enabled the commercial banks to create bank holding companies for purposes of expanding their range of operations. That is to say, relaxed
restrictions began to permit these banks to use the holding companies as umbrellas
for expansion into nonbanking activities, including securities activities. Thus, such
services as leasing, data processing, investment management, and foreign investment
banking had become, and continue to be, permitted to the commercial banks [20].
4.4. New computer and telecommunications capacity
Commercial banks have been highly successful in their efforts to take advantage
of the availability of sophisticated computer and telecommunications technologies.
For example, they have proven themselves adept at handling large numbers of
accounts, switching funds electronically from one account to another, and providing rapid access data bank retrieval services and low cost hard copy. This
increased capacity to handle efficiently large numbers of customers and accounts
provided much impetus for the commercial banks' movement into the securities
business. In addition, corporate clients encouraged this expansion since they often
felt dissatisfied with the services they were receiving from their investment banks.
Investment banks, brokerage firms, and other securities industry businesses eased
the commercial banks' encroachment into their business by failing to keep pace
with the new opportunities afforded by the new electronic technologies. This
failure occurred for several reasons. First, few brokerage firms underwent the
management revolution that commercial banks underwent. Most of them remained
partnerships and were run by partners in the style of the 1930s. Secondly, computer systems were expensive to develop and to operate; few brokerage firms were
large enough to have the capital base necessary to support such development and
operation. Thirdly, the development process requires that brokerage firms, invest-

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol2/iss3/2

A. iV. Sametz et aL

Securitiesactivitiesof commercial banks

ment banks, and other securities industry businesses - including trading markets coordinate their electronic systems with each other and with government regulatory
agencies and industry associations; the large brokerage firms, the S.E.C., and the
brokerage industry associations have been slow in the movement to form a
coordinated system. Large banks, the Federal Reserve Board, and the American
Bankers Association have worked at developing such a system. Finally, brokerage
firms felt little need to mass merchandise; fixed commission rates made the securities industry profitable for the small individual brokerage firms and the industry
generally did little to develop the capacity to handle large numbers of customers or
orders [211.
5. Current attempts by commercial banks to expand and increase their securities
activities
As commercial banks awakened to the age of sophisticated electronic technologies, they began to seek new ways to increase their profits and compensate for
their slackening deposit and short-term loan businesses. Naturally, they looked to
securities. Commercial banks were accustomed to the problems and the modes of
operation of the securities industry because traditionally they had close ties with it.
From their earliest history in the United States, commercial banks have
extended credit to brokerage firms for purposes of purchasing private and government debt securities. Later, in the 1860s, they extended the service to cover corporate equity securities. Commercial banks have also been the largest and steadiest
customers of brokerage firms. Through their trust departments, especially in their
role as trustee of pension funds, they have traded heavily in the secondary markets.
They have also been large-scale purchasers of securities research services, since their
activity as trustee requires them to be well informed about the securities markets.
Finally, the commercial banks have had contacts with the securities business
through the securities-related services they have provided to their corporate clients.
They have acted as transfer agent or registrar for their clients' securities, trustee and
agent for their clients' debentures, and paying agent for their clients' dividends.
The banks have attempted, or are currently continuing to attempt, various
means to expand and increase their securities and securities-related activities. Some
of these means have included dealing in negotiable deposit certificates, rapidly
expanding underwriting business abroad, writing term loan agreements that include
escalator interest rate clauses, and forming multipurpose one-bank holding companies. Commercial banks have also used means that would enable them to participate more directly in the securities markets. These means, recently or currently
attempted, are discussed below.
5.1. Revenue bond underwriting
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly allows national banks to underwrite general obligations of any state or political subdivision thereof. It alsd allows
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the banks to underwrite certain other kinds of municipal obligations. These are
specified in the statute and include obligations issued for such purposes as transportation development, housing, and education. However, the statute does not
make any mention of the underwriting of state and municipal revenue bonds. At
the time of fle passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, revenue bonds constituted less
than 3 percent of total state and municipal bonds; the vast majority consisted of
general obligation bonds [22]. Today, however, revenue bonds comprise approximately one-half of all the state and municipal bonds issued [23]. Consequently,
commercial banks no longer are content to underwrite only general obligation state
and municipal bonds; they are currently seeking amendment of tile Act to permit
them to underwrite all forms of revenue bonds [24].
The central issue in the debate over whether to permit commercial banks to
underwrite revenue bonds is whether the net potential benefits to issuers would
outweigh the potential harm to the securities industry and thence to investors.
(i) Benefits to issuers. In the early 1960s the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Reserve Board studied comparative costs for the flotation of revenue
bonds and general obligation bonds, respectively. It was found that general obligation bonds were less costly to float than revenue bonds. Subsequent studies have
'been conducted in order to determine whether the difference in cost is due to the
competition from commercial banks for the business of floating general obligation
bonds. Most of these studies seemed to indicate that a savings of 1-2 percent of
total value of revenue issues would result if commerical banks were allowed to enter
into the revenue bond business [25]. Serious criticism of these findings developed,
however, as problems with statistics and difficulties in making the two instruments
equivalent were revealed.
Cost savings to the issuing government result from increased competition among
the underwriters for the issues - lower spreads or costs of flotation - and, from
competition among the newly found buyers for the issues - lower coupons. or
reoffering yields. For banks' entry to lead to reduced costs in these ways there must
currently be less than perfect competition among underwriters (a less than optimal
number of bidders) and imperfect markets for municipals (less than fully informed
and integrated market pricing). It would be easy to demonstrate such savings for
small revenue bonds that are negotiated with a sole bidder as contrasted with large
competitively bid general obligations, provided the basic qualities of the instruments were alike. The real empirical issue is how to design samples of revenue
bonds that are comparable in every respect except that some have become eligible
for banks' underwriting and others have not. In short, the problem is to hold constant all factors affecting costs of floating new revenue bonds except bank entry
into the business.
More recent research seems to have resolved many of the methodological problems, but resolution of these problems has led to a decrease in the consensus estimate of cost savings to issuers. The revised estimate is 1 percent of the total
proceeds of new issues.
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Studies have shown that the marginal impact, i.e. the impact of adding an additional bidder, falls rapidly as the number of bidders increases. For instance, an
increase from one bidder to two, or from two bidders to three, would have a substantial impact on the bidding; an increase from four to five would have little
impact. Although differences between revenue and general obligation bonds may
result in the number of bids being relatively fewer for the former than for the latter,
studies predict that the number of bids for revenue bonds would increase if banks
were to become eligible to underwrite them. Even though revenue bonds are usually
negotiated rather than put up for bidding, and so are not exactly comparable to
general obligation bonds, bank participation in the underwriting of revenue bonds
would likely improve local distribution and reduce borrowing costs.
The impact of commercial bank eligibility on reoffering yields was first demonstrated directly by the work of Phillip Cagan [261. He determined that bank
eligibility would result in a decrease of twenty basis points in net interest costs to
the issuer. Thus, savings during the period 1968-1977 would have averaged
1.5 percent of the total value of revenue bonds offered, or $ 150 million per year.
Savings during 1977 would have averaged over $ 400 million on new revenue bond
issues of S 27 billion.
A study conducted by Michael Mussa [27] reworked Cagan's data and determined that there would be a savings of only one basis point in net interest costs to
the issuer for the year 1977. Mussa criticized Cagan's statistical methodology
(especially his sampling procedure) and found that eligible and noneligible revenue
bonds are not comparable. Also, he made several assumptions that Cagan did not
make. He assumed (a) savings to issuers must stem primarily from cuts in reoffering
yields, rather than from cuts in underwriter spreads; (b) competition in the industry
is so intense that profits are already at a minimum; (c) all buyers for revenue bonds
and already known or have been uncovered, and (d) all revenue bond issuers are
fully informed.
Taken backwards, Mussa's argument is that (1) there are no savings possible from
bank entry into the revenue bond business; (2) if the price to investors is increased
(underwriter spread cannot be cut) this will only have the effect of lowering the
price of general obligation bonds; and (3) the only revenue bonds significantly
affected by cuts in reoffering yields or by price increases would be small, risky
bonds that are driven by issuers to competitive bidding. Mussa notes that the
driving of the bonds to competitive bidding is unlikely since it would already have
been insisted on by borrower-issuers in this fully competitive market if in fact it
could achieve a cost savings for them.
In good part, Mussa discounts the problem by assuming that there already exists
a highly competitive and perfectly informed revenue bond market. If this were in
fact the case, one would wonder why commercial banks are so eager to enter into
the market, and others are equally eager to keep them out. Moreover, increased
competition by banks for small, negotiated issues is likely to cut issuance costs as
the result of both cuts in underwriter spreads and the development and uncovering
of new revenue bond investors.
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A review of all the empirical work on issuer savings from bank entry into the
revenue bond market suggests that there would be an average savings in cost to
issuers of fourteen basis points per bond, the equivalent of 1 percent of total
revenue bond proceeds; that is, for example, a savings in 1977 of S 270 million out
of the annual aggregate revenue bonds value of $ 27 billion. Putting aside Cagan's
estimate of $ 411 million and Mussa's estimate of S 0, estimates in the literature of
the savings to be derived from the lowering of reoffering yields range between $ 9
and $ 14 per $ 1000 bond; savings from cuts in underwriter spreads average between
$ 1 and $ 4 per $ 1000 bond; and savings from driving the bonds to bidding range
between $ 0 and $ 5 per $ 1000 bond [28]. Thus, for the year 1977, estimated
savings on a total of $ 27 billion in revenue bond issues, range between $ 150 million and $ 350 million [29].
(ii) Hann to the securities industry. The securities industry argues that commercial banks, if permitted to underwrite revenue bonds, would take over the
revenue bond business. This is inconsistent with the industry view that there is
already such intense competition that no cost savings to issuers would result from
bank entry into the market. Moreover, commercial bank underwriting of general
obligation bonds has not led to bank pre-emption in that business; the business is in
fact quite evenly divided between commercial bank and noncommercial bank
underwriters. General obligation bond underwriting statistics for 1976-77 show
that commercial banks accounted for 18 percent of total dollar value, or 29 percent
of the number of bonds issued, while investment banks accounted for 22 percent
of total dollar value, or 45 percent of the number of bonds issued; syndicates consisting of both commercial and investment banking institutions accounted for
60 percent of total dollar value, or 26 percent of the number of bonds issued [30].
There does not appear to be much difference in the concentration ratios of commercial and investment banks with respect to the number of general obligation
bonds underwritten by the respective top ten institutions. The top ten commercial
banks handle 75 percent of the total commercial bank underwriting of the bonds;
the top ten investment bankers handle 60 percent of the total noncommercial bank
underwriting of the bonds. General obligation bonds worth $ 1 million or less
appear to be well distributed between commercial and noncommercial banks, and
between large and small underwriters [31 ].
The two leading underwriters in 1977 were the Chase Manhattan Bank and
Merrill Lynch - each handled 5 percent of the total annual underwriting. The top
twenty underwriters who underwrote half of the annual total of $ 17 billion in
bonds, included nine commercial banks. However, commercial banks are less significant in the figures for bond issues worth $ 5 million or less.
If commercial banks were permitted to underwrite revenue bonds, there is little
if any danger that they would neglect or monopolize the market for smaller issues.
Commercial bank offices are spread throughout the country and it is likely that
regional banks would become more important, especially for local revenue issues.
Similarly, there are currently three or four regional investment banks among the
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top twenty municipal bond-dealing investment banks.
The securities firms claim that commercial banks have an unfair competitive
advantage over them in that the banks have privileged capital-raising sources. However, today it is difficult to speak of interest-free or even low-interest deposit
sources of capital [32]. Funds may indeed be more available to the banks, but the
marginal cost of the capital used for underwriting is probably the same for commercial bankers as it is for investment bankers. In any case, the capital required
for underwriting of revenue bonds is small to begin with, and therefore not a
legitimate cause for concern.
In one tax aspect, commercial banks do have an apparent advantage over their
potential securities industry competitors. Securities firms that generally borrow
mainly from banks in order to carry inventories of revenue bonds are not permitted to deduct the interest cost as an expense; this cost is not so singled out in
commercial bank operations. The banks can hold tax exempt bonds both as investments and as trading inventory. The burden of the tax is not so great, however,
with regard to new issues: these are largely pre-sold and unsold bonds are inventoried for only a few weeks. With regard to secondary trades, the burden is indeed
great and so the securities firms would be entitled to tax equalization in the event
that commercial banks were permitted to underwrite revenue bonds.
Finally, the securities industry maintains that conflicts of interest would result if
commercial banks were permitted to underwrite revenue bonds. This is inconsistent
with the fact that the banks have never been charged with conflicts of interest in
connection with their long-term underwriting of general obligation bonds. If
revenue bonds increasingly develop along industrial development lines, the comparison to corporate bond underwriting and its episodes of abusive practice would
not be far-fetched. However, these developments are unlikely since commercial, as
well as investment banks' municipal bond activities are subject to self-regulation
(M.S.R. Board), and to bank examination and S.E.C. procedures, respectively.
Conflicts of interest might well arise under crisis conditions, such as those
that existed in the 1930s. Conditions could arise under which banks would be
tempted for a short time to sell unwanted revenue bonds to trust funds or customer
accounts. Conditions also could possibly arise under which banks might treat
revenue bonds as loss leaders and thereby create possible concentration problems.
Strict regulation however could prevent such actions by the banks.
There is one aspect of commercial bank underwriting of revenue bonds that does
cause some difficulty. Unlike general obligation bonds that are 95 percent competitively bid, approximately 50 percent of revenue bonds are negotiated. Moreover, the dollar value of new issue revenue bonds tends to be larger than the value
of general obligation issues [33]. Insofar as revenue issues are both negotiated and
large in value, they are comparable to large negotiated public corporate bond issues.
Competitively bid issues place the underwriter at arm's length distance from the
issuer; the underwriter in effect takes the issues as they come, or leaves them. The
negotiated issues, however, do not place the two parties at arm's length distance
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from one another; rather they place the underwriter in the position of financial
adviser since he is of necessity included as part of the design of the terms and conditions of the bond offering. The restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act were aimed,
in part, precisely at those combination roles of bond designer/underwriter and
bond buyer/lender [34]. There is another side to this difficulty.
The financial adviser role that could develop between issuers and underwriters
could also possibly lead to institutional trading relationships between the underwriter and state or local government pension funds. From the point of view of the
securities industry it would be safer to allow banks to enter the competitively bid
revenue bond business than the negotiated revenue bond business; but in fact, it is
the latter business that is currently in need of additional participants.
5.2. Brokerage activities
Commercial banks have been trying for years to engage in increasing numbers of
clearly brokerage activities. As to some of these activities, the banks have been
successful; as to others, especially mutual fund sales - their principal brokerage
target - they have been unsuccessful. This subsection describes the most important
of the brokerage activities that interest the commercial banks. It pays special attention to mutual fund sales because these were the type of activity at issue in tile
most recent relevant Supreme Court decision, Investment Company Institute
(I.C.L) v. Camp.
(i) Dividend reinvestmentplans. The first dividend reinvestment plan was offered
in 1968. At present, nearly all banks that are dividend disbursing agents offer such
plans. There are almost 1000 such plans administered by approximately eighty
banks on behalf of more than a million individuals and institutions. No service provided by securities firms has ever attracted such a widespread following or grown so
quickly [35].
As originally offered, dividend reinvestment plans entitled individual beneficial
owners of stock to have the bank automatically reinvest their dividends into additional shares of stock of the same company. The bank would pool the dividends to
be reinvested and purchase the shares through a brokerage firm at the institutional
rate (this rate has dropped 80 percent since the first dividend reinvestment plan was
offered). Then the bank would allocate the shares and its costs to the individual
accounts. Fractional sales were also allocated. The bank retained the stock certificates and sent out quarterly statements to their customers.
These plans have been broadened steadily. Banks permit investors to put in additional cash which is aggregated and invested along with the rest of the investment
pool. In order to forestall participation by larger institutions, a yearly dollar limit
is placed upon the additional cash investment; the typical limit has grown from
$ 1000 to over S 10,000. Some banks permit institutional participation in the
dividend reinvestment part of the plan but prohibit participation in the additional
cash part of the plan. Only individuals or institutions that are direct holders of the
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stock can participate at all. [36]. At the time of writing there is no provision made
in these plans for stock held in street names, because it is felt there is no way possible to recover the costs of providing such a service. Fees to accounts usually consist
of allocated brokerage fees plus a bank service charge which ranges from 50 cents to
4 dollars. Generally, the bank service charge is not enough to cover all bank
expenses, so company clients often supplement their payments with additional cash
or business to the bank. Many brokers discourage very small transactions, i.e. those
involving less than $ 100, and so banks prefer larger transactions. In 1978, the
customer's bill was often one-half to three-quarters less than the total fee would
have been if the transaction had been made directly by the stockholder with his
broker.
Some features of current dividend reinvestment plans resemble some features of
mutual funds [371. However, banks have not been required to register under the
Investment Company Act. Thus, under existing banking regulations banks (1) have
relative freedom to promote such plans, (2) can use the cash flows for these plans
until the purchase price of the securities acquired is due, (3) need not indicate to
customers the specific amount of brokerage charges incurred, and (4) need not
acquire the securities by bringing the order to the stock exchange for company's
stock traded on the exchange.
(ii) Employee investment plans. Employee investment plans are really joint service plans offered by banks and their corporate clients to employees of the corporate client. The method of operation is similar to that for dividend reinvestment
plans. Each month participating employees designate a particular part of their
salary to be deducted by the company. The amount can range from $ 10 to 10 percent of their salary. The company forwards the funds to the bank which then pools
the funds and purchases the company's stock on the secondary market. Often the
company pays the bank service charge and brokerage fees as a fringe benefit for
participating employees. Thus, the employees receive the shares at low net cost.
The bank sends periodic statements to the employees indicating current transactions and position in the pool of stock.
In addition to the secondary market purchase plans, there are also in operation a
few original issue plans. Some of these were established by banks themselves for
their own employees. There would seem to be some conflict of interest here, but
since banks have some difficulty raising equity capital through regular investment
banking channels, the practice may grow. Sometimes the new-issue shares are
offered at a discount (generally larger than the 5 percent discount typical of
original issue dividend reinvestment plans), but even on a current market price basis
the low transactions costs may make the purchase plans attractive to employees.
The first employee investment plans were offered in the early 1950s. Today,
there are fewer banks offering such plans and the number of employee participants
is less than 15 percent of the number of participants in the dividend reinvestment
plans [38]. A few brokerage firms compete with the banks' employee stock purchase plans. In fact, one firm, Merrill Lynch, seems to have more accounts in this
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area than all the banks put together [391. Since participating corporations support
the cost of this service, it would seem marginally attractive for institutions who
already offer dividend reinvestment plans to also offer employee investment plans.
This does not seem to be happening. Part of the explanation may be that the
depressed stock market of the early 1970s made purchase of one's own company
stock (or any other stock) unattractive to small investors. As the tone of the market
improves, demand for such plans may increase.
(iii) Automatic investment service. This bank brokerage service is designed for
individual checking account customers. The banks deduct an authorized amount
from a participating customer's checking account (usually S 25 to S 500) once a
month for investment in securities chosen by the customer. Securities are selected
from a bank-supplied listing of what are essentially the twenty largest corporations
in Standard and Poor's 425 Industrial Index. Deductions for stock purchases are
pooled and turned over to the bank's trust department trading desk for execution.
Each customer receives share credits based on average price, allocated brokerage
expense, and a bank service charge. The service charge averages about S 2 per share
purchased.
This service was introduced in about 1973 but has not been very successful. At
present, approximately twenty banks offer such plans [40]; fewer than 10,000
individuals have participated in the plans, investing less than S 100 per month. The
few brokerage firms that have quietly offered competitive plans have also noted a
lack of success. Since costs are clearly lower than for direct stock purchase, it is not
clear why these plans are unpopular. Perhaps it is because of the restricted choice of
securities. Although the existence of these plans has been an extreme irritant to the
mutual fund industry (the Investment Company Institute has filed suit, arguing that
such bank plans are prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act), the current competitive
threat is very small.
(iv) Individual portfolio management service. In performing this service, the
bank acts as agent for the customer. The customer instructs the bank and the bank
in turn transmits the order to a brokerage firm for transaction. The customer
chooses the broker. It has been estimated that about 4300 *banks provide such
customer transaction service for individuals who do not want to deal directly with
brokerage firms. Hundreds of thousands of orders are placed this way every year,
more than 15 percent of them by bank employees who know about the service. The
typical order is for less than $ 5000. For nonbank employees the typical fee is $ 25
plus perhaps 15 € per share commission. Thus, the cost of transacting a $ 5000
order through the bank which has access to institutional-sized discounts is smaller
than the current standard brokerage rate.
As a separate service, these transactions are probably unprofitable for a bank,
but the relatively, small volume per bank makes losses insignificant. Chemical Batik
did experiment with offering a more regular customer transaction service; it
advertised a phone-in order desk and standard brokerage firm service. The fees
charged were quite high, however, and the experiment failed. In any case Chemical
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Bank's service would probably have been ruled illegal under the Glass-Steagall Act
because it involved the active solicitation characteristic of the brokerage business
rather than the clearly permissible sales made "solely upon the order" of the
customer.
Bank customer transaction services generally are attractive from a cost viewpoint.
But such services are seldom advertised or even noted in bank literature. They are
special, occasional services provided for regular bank customers on demand. Traditionally, the securities industry has not regarded such passive services as any type
of threat, and in any case they are exempt from Glass-Steagall proscriptions provided they fit within the category of "customer accommodation" brokerage.
(v) Individual pension plans. Individual pension plans offered by the banks are
tax benefited retirement plans for employed individuals not covered for pensions
by their employers. These plans usually require the investor to invest in bank
savings accounts or in a bank designated mutual fund. Such plans are exempt from
the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act;
however, investments in such plans are not exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
Banks have not promoted these plans as aggressively as have insurance companies or thrift institutions. The potential market is large however and the securities
industry is opposed to allowing the banks to offer such plans. It is not likely that
the plans are violative of the Glass-Steagall Act. In offering these plans, the banks
act as fiduciaries and banks have long been permitted to operate collective investment funds when the designated funds are of either of the following types: (a)
pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other trusts exempted from tax by the
Internal Revenue Code, or (b) funds held as executor, administrator, guardian, or
trustee under a will or deed [41].
(vi) Mutual funds. Mutual funds are commingled managing agency accounts
created by an agreement authorizing the managing agent, Le. the bank, to exercise
investment discretion in managing the assets of the principal, i.e. the customer. The
account is registered as an investment company and the customer receives undivided interests in the fund, or units of participation. The units of participation are
registered as securities and can be marketed only through the fund.
In 1963 the Comptroller of the Currency issued Regulation 9 which allowed
national banks to maintain customers' agency accounts collectively invested in a
common fund managed by the trust departments of the banks. Shortly thereafter,
the First National City Bank (Citibank) designed a plan that strongly resembled a
mutual fund. Under the plan it offered to accept deposits of at least $ 10,000 for
investment in common stock. All such funds were to be commingled so as to
achieve economies of scale and the depositor was to receive units of participation in
this commingled fund. The Investment Company Institute brought suit against Citibank to prevent it and other banks from offering any such plans. The legal challenge reached the Supreme Court which decided in favor of the Investment Company Institute.
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In that case, ICI v. Camp [421, the plaintiffs argued that the creation and operation of an investment fund by a bank which offers to its customers the opportunity
to purchase an interest in the fund's assets constitutes the issuing, underwriting,
selling or distributing of securities or stocks. The purchase of stock by a bank's
investment fund was a purchase of stock by a bank for its own account and, as
such, was a clear violation of section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Furthermore,
plaintiffs argued, if the bank's investment fund was considered an entity distinct
from the bank, then the bank's affiliation with the fund was a violation of section 21 of the Act.
The Court framed the dispute in terms of whether the plan involved the bank in
the underwriting of noneligible securities. In holding against Comptroller of the
Currency Camp the Court declared that while it is not improper under the GlassSteagall Act for a bank to pool trust assets, act as a managing agent for individual
customers, or purchase stock for the account of its customers, "the union of these
powers gives birth to an investment fund whose activities are of a different
character". Such a union necessarily involves the bank in purchasing stock for its
own account and in issuing stock; there is no distinction between sale of an interest
in the business of buying, holding, and selling stocks for investment and sale of an
interest in a commercial or industrial enterprise. There is, however, a distinction
between "the sale of fiduciary services and the sale of investments". In the case at
hand, the Court determined that the plan involved the bank in the prohibited sale
of investments. Thus, the Court held the plan to be in violation of sections 16 and
21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
The Camp decision dealt a great blow to early bank attempts to enter the mutual
funds business; banks and the Comptroller view it not as a definitive barrier but
merely as an obstacle to be avoided. Banks are presently permitted to engage in a
number of related activities and thus far seem to have had some success in their
efforts to expand their securities activities. For instance, banks are permitted to act
as management agents for individual portfolios so long as the customers get individualized service, banks do not have investment discretion, and customers can choose
among a number of brokers. Furthermore, banks are allowed to act as advisers to
mutual funds and can themselves set up closed-end mutual funds.
The Investment Company Institute continues to seek to enjoin these activities
and has met with some success in the federal district courts. Existing mutual funds
have been suffering for several years from investor withdrawals and so are conducting near open warfare with the banks for whom mutual funds could mean big
business. The outcome of this battle is as yet unclear. Litigation might ultimately
favor the securities industry, but legislation could well favor the banks, provided
that the banks were willing to submit to S.E.C., rather than to traditional banking
authority regulation.
5.3. Privateplacements

Commercial banks are not expressly prohibited from engaging in private placement activity. In fact, they have been engaging in such activity for quite some time,
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mainly in response to the growing institutional investor market for corporate
securities. This increased demand for securities has made it difficult for the commercial banks to maintain and acquire customers for their long-term loans business;
corporations increasingly prefer securities financing and often look to institutional
investors for just such. financing.
Only recently has the right of commercial banks to engage in private placement
activity been challenged by the securities industry. Private placements presently
account for a large part of all corporate new debt and equity issues. In the period
since 1966, they have accounted for one-third of total new issues; the annual range
varies between 15 and 50 percent. Banks currently accomplish approximately 78 percent of all private placements. Thus, the banks now privately place approximately 2 percent of all new corporate issues. Since private placements are the predominant method for nongiant industrial corporate financing, it is likely that banks
privately place at least 10 percent of all new issues of small/medium sized industrial
corporation securities. In absolute terms, since 1976 bank-advised private placements have exceeded $1 billion per year. Thus, they appear to be big business for
the banks, and the investment industry is concerned. Consequently it has begun
to challenge the right of commercial banks to engage in such activity.
The challenge centers around the question of whether the Glass-Steagall Act
implicitly prohibits private placement activity by commercial banks. Sections 16
and 21, taken together, prohibit the issuance, underwriting, distribution, or sale of
securities. Clearly, private placement does not involve the issuance of securities, and
so it differs significantly from underwriting and distribution. Private placements
involve the sale of corporate securities to particular purchasers, usually institutional
investors, who are highly sophisticated or who have advisers who are highly
sophisticated in investment matters; underwritings and distributions involve the sale
and distribution of corporate securities to the general public, many of which are
persons unsophisticated in investment matters. Furthermore, private placements
involve the commercial bank as an adviser to the corporation seeking to have
its securities placed; transfer of the securities is accomplished directly by the issuer.
Underwritings and distributions involve the investment banker or broker/dealer as
intermediary between the issuer and the purchaser; the intermediary acts either as
principal or agent.
It is unclear whether private placements constitute sales of securities within the
context of the Glass-Steagall Act. The question turns on the meaning of the word
"sale" in the context of the usual underwriting and distribution situation, i e. where
a broker/dealer sells securities to the public as either agent or principal. Clearly the
private placement commercial bank engages in some activities that could well be
deemed a part of the selling process of a security, i.e. the bank searches the market
for potential investors, negotiates with them, and assists the corporate client in
drawing up the terms and the timing of the offer. However, it is not clear to what
extent these activities make the private placement a "sale" of securities.
If the private placement were deemed a sale then the issue would become
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whether section 16 permits such a type of sale. Since the section permits sales of
securities "upon the order, and for the account of, customers", it could be argued
that the corporate client is, in the context of a private placement, merely a customer
of the bank, and that the private placement is a sale for the account of a customer
of the bank, i.e. the corporate client. However, the section also requires that such
sales must be transacted "without recourse", that is, without any guarantee
against loss. In some cases commercial banks receive from their clients, the issuing
corporations, fees contingent upon the successful placement of the securities.
The purpose of private placements is, of course, to raise money for the corporation issuing the privately placed securities. Insofar as this is also the main reason
for the existence of investment banks, all securities activities designed to raise
money for the corporation could be considered investment banking activities. If
this is deemed to be the case, then such activities might possibly be prohibited to
the commercial banks under Camp, for there the Court declared that one of the
objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act was to prevent commercial banks from going
into the investment banking business. It is noteworthy that the Act does in fact
expressly permit commercial banks to engage in some types of investment banking
activity, i.e. the underwriting and distribution of general obligation government
bonds. Therefore, it is not entirely clear that the Act necessarily prohibits private
placements. Moreover, the Camp decision was rendered in the context of commercial banks' activities in selling securities (units of participation in commingled
managing agency accounts) to the general public and the holding could be confined
to the facts of that case.
Investment banks maintain that commercial banks have competitive advantages
that could result in conflict of interest and concentration of economic power
difficulties. First, they claim that commercial banks have access to and some control over necessitous customers, dependent upon bank lines of credit for more or
less permanent financing. The banks may restrict, or tie, access to bank loans to
private placement customers. Secondly, banks can combine lines of credit and
term loans with a private placement to comprise an overall financing package. If
*this package were an all-or-nothing plan, rather than one based bpon cost economies
or greater service, it would be unfairly competitive. Thirdly, banks as depositories
are said to have special advantages in raising capital over investment banks. The
Securities Industry Association refers to these "special advantages and privileges deposit insurance, access to the discount window, tax breaks" - as subsidies [45].
Finally, banks are subject only to the bank regulatory agencies' authority, which is
deemed not as stringent as the S.E.C. It is feared by the investment banks that these
compertitive advantages combined with the presently weakened condition of securities firms will lead to a concentration of the private placement business in the hands
of commercial banks.
Statistics do not seem to support the concentration of power argument. A data
survey for the years 1976-77 reveals that commercial banks had 7 percent, or
$ 1.5 billion worth, of the private placement market. During that period the total
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value of privately placed corporate securities was $ 20 billion; total securities
offerings were S 60 billion. The S 1.5 billion worth of private placements was
handled by thirty-two banks, with almost half of it handled by five large banks.
None of these banks, however, ranked among the top ten private placement organizations; those slots w'ere occupied by the large investment banking houses. The top
ten did two-thirds of all the private placement business during that period. Generally speaking, private placement is a business conducted by large financial institutions, whether commercial bank or not; 85 percent of the business is conducted by
the twenty largest institutions.
Commercial bank private placements were largely confined (75 percent) to loan
and deposit customers. Proceeds from the placements were usually used to expand
the business, not to pay off loans. Bank loans were part of the package of bank
financing, capped by a private placement of securities. The banks did tend to
assist customers who had bank loans outstanding and who added to term debt as
part of the total financing package. In other respects (size, industry, etc.) issuers
working through commercial banks were similar to those working through investment banks.
The potential for concentrated power in commercial banks is slim. A study conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation indicated that "[if] the business of all
commercial banks were to triple, while that of investment banks remained unchanged, no new commercial bank would break into the top twenty advisors. The
three commercial banks previously among the second ten advisors would move into
the top ten. The highest ranking commercial bank would edge into fifth place ... "
[44]. The top four's share of all investment banks' share would fall then from 39 to
36 percent.
Stanford Research Institute, in its 1977 forecast of the future of the securities
industry, estimated that the commercial banks' share of private placements "might
reach" 15-20 percent by 1981 [45]. This would be a tripling of the current 67 percent share. Both studies assumed no major shift in regulation of private placement activity.
Concentration is feared for its long-term effect of driving investment bankers out
of business. It would be unusual in theory and in practice for increased numbers of
competitors to cause decreased competitiveness in an industry, although it may well
be that the size of the competitors may become larger and the composition of the
competitors more diverse. In any case, the Glass-Steagall Act was not enacted in
order to affect ompetition for private placement business, nor to preserve the business exclusively for the investment banks; its primary aim was to disengage commercial banking from those aspects of the securities business that created an unacceptable degree of risk for banks and their depositors and customers. Thus, it
addressed potential hazards to the economy as a whole. Banks' funds are not placed
at risk when commercial banks engage in private placement activity. Rather, it is
only the bank's ability to act as adviser in private placement matters that is placed
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on the line. The private placement business forms only a small portion of total bank
assets of business loans. For 1976, private placements were the source of 0.1 percent of bank assets and 10 percent of business loans. Even for the leading five
banks, private placements were the source of only 1 percent of total assets and
5 percent of business loans [46]. Tripling these activities to 3 percent would hardly
affect bank stability.
The competitive advantages that are enjoyed by the commercial banks are not so
obvious as the securities industry claims they are. First, commercial banks are
absolutely prohibited from underwriting and distributing public issues of corporate
securities; only the securities industry can do that. Two-thirds of all business corporation debt/equity issues are offered publicly, therefore the securities industry is
assured of this business. Many issuers, such as utility companies, are required by law
to offer their securities publicly. The private placement mode of financing is unlikely to overtake this business. In any case, 25 percent of all private placements are
conducted entirely by the issuer, with no assistance from commercial or investment
banks.
Secondly, surveys have shown that commercial bank private placements are
priced in accordance with securities industry practice. Investment banks are able to
offer financing packages to their customers, as well. Most large issuers sell their
issues both publicly and privately and can be offered packages of long-term financing
to woo them away from commercial bank financing packages. The efficiency of the
investment banker as a finance specialist can also offset any convenience offered by
commercial bank one-stop financing.
Thirdly, if it is true that "most of the private placement clients of commercial
banks [are] previous or current loan or deposit customers", it is also true that
most of the private placement clients of investment banks are previous or current
public issue customers [47]. The investment banks also maintain long-term relationships with their customers. Finally, investment bank private placement activity is
not subject to S.E.C. regulation. Investment banks are not registered as broker/
dealers for private placement purposes. Both investment and commercial banks are
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws;-but only banks are
subject to multiexamination procedures.
Securities firms also argue that commercial banks would become involved in conflict of interest situations if they engaged in private placement activities. It is
alleged that banks might be tempted to direct private placements so as to bail the
bank out of problem loans, dump inferior loans into bank-managed trust funds, or
replace outstanding loans, thereby drumming up trade. Such voluntary reciprocity
or tie-in effects, the very essence of conflict of interests, would be implicit in the
structure of the joint market situation or explicit by arrangement between the two
parties.
The first allegation is not supported by available evidence. Evidence thus far
indicates that only a small proportion, one-fifth, of privately placed funds is used to
repay sound or unsound bank loans [48]. Institutional purchasers of private place-
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ments, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, who in 1976 took
60 percent and 35 percent, respectively, of investment banks' private placements,
are unlikely to take up issues made to pay off outstanding unsound bank loans. A
slightly more realistic possibility is that unsound loans might be made in the future
to bolster a faltering privately placing issuer that a bank had advised. However, this
mode of reputation saving is uneconomic and unbusinesslike, and would likely be
noticed and criticized by regulatory authorities in the process of their bank
examinations. Thus, if such an event were to occur, it is unlikely that the bank
would mike such loans again.
The second allegation concerning dumping also is unlikely to occur. Bank
examination procedures would uncover intrabank dumping of poor placements. In
any case, bank policy, common law, and bank regulations specifically prohibit it
[49]. This prohibition could be formalized by placing it into amendments to the
Glass-Steagall Act. Amendments allowing commercial banks to engage in private
placement activities could detail the necessary bank trust department examinations.
The third and final allegation, concerning drumming-up trade, is not very convincing. Commercial banks already advise their clients with respect to such items as
loan terms, capital structure, pension plans, taxes, etc. There is no reason why
advice regarding private placements should be deemed to create any conflicts of
interest that are greater than those present in the other areas in which banks act as
advisers.
Generally speaking, no single aspect of potential conflict of interest situations is
powerful and convincing; nor is the fear realistic that bank size and power will
result in less rather than more competition, at least for the next decade. Nonetheless, a combination of minor conflicts of interest in the banking industry, plus
further contraction and structural change in the securities industry - an industry
still adjusting to the shocks of automation and competitive commissions of the
1970s - may well, when summed up, cause both Congress and the courts to
restrain further bank entry into this area of the securities business.
5.4. Some additionalsecuritiesactivities in which banks seek further engagement
The largest, most rapidly growing involvement of banks in securities industry
activities has been in the investment services provided to corporations. Banks'
trust departments currently manage about $ 400 billion in financial assets. Of this
total, approximately $ 150 billion is managed as personal trust, perhaps another
$ 80 billion as personal agency, and the largest component, more than $ 170 billion,
as corporate employee benefit plans [50]. The growth of these plans and bank
involvement in their administration is one of the primary factors causing a change
in the traditional institutional structure of the securities industry in the 1970s. It is
due, in part, to fiduciary constraints in the pension laws which inhibit corporate
management of the plans, and in part to the securities industry's inability adequately to service this rapidly growing area.
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Banks have been permitted to operate such pooled plans since 1955. They are
operated as mutual funds, except that the clients are corporate pension funds and
withdrawal by a client from participation takes a little longer than it would for an
individual to sell his mutual fund shares. More than $ 25 billion has already been
invested in these pooled fund pension plans and banks are aggressively seeking new
business in this area. Banks seeking this business are not constrained by the proscriptions against advertising, management fee rules, professional standards tests, or
trading restrictions which the S.E.C. imposes on those businesses that operate
within the securities industry. Since banks are going after parts of the funds of large
corporations, and all of the pension funds of small coporations (many with fewer
than 100 employees), the securities industry views this activity as a serious direct
threat. The Investment Company Institute has argued that banks are in fact merchandising interests in these funds in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act and has
filed suit to halt the practice.
In a closely related development, the Federal Reserve Board, even after the
Camp decision, adopted regulations permitting a subsidiary of a bank holding company to act as an investment adviser, to sponsor and advise a closed-end mutual fund,
and to advise but not sponsor or control an open-end mutual fund. There are more
than fifty such investment advisory affiliates; most are registered as advisers under
the Investment Advisers Act, but a few are organized as bank trust companies and
have not registered. Already, banks are advising open-end mutual funds with assets
of more than $ 1.5 billion and have organized closed-end funds with assets
approaching $ 1 billion. In addition, some of those affiliates are selling investment
research and advice directly to customers - largely other institutional investors and
correspondent banks.
The permitted investment advisory activities have not worked out entirely in the
banks' favor. Shortly after such activities were permitted, a number of banks,
through their subsidiaries, became the advisory companies for mortgage or real
estate investment trusts. Between 1970 and 1975, bank-sponsored real estate investment trusts (REITs) became the largest segment of this new industry. More than
forty REITs were advised by subsidiaries of bank holding companies. The banks
provided more than $ 10 billion in loans to these firms. Although banks did not
directly market the shares of their REITs, they provided the illusion of banksponsorship and responsibility - more a fact than illusion, as it turned out [51].
With the collapse of the real estate market in 1974-75, most REITs found
themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. They looked to their sponsoring financial
institutions (usually banks) to bail them out, and the banks did. There were severe
conflicts of interest created in this whole process. Banks transferred high risk loans
to their REITs, extended loans on favorable terms, had officers who took finders
fees, and when the REITs faced bankruptcy, repurchased loans or extended credit
on terms unfavorable to the bank's own stockholders. The securities industry and
Investment Company Institute have been quick to point out that these were exactly
the conditions the Glass-Steagall Act was intended to prevent, and it was possible
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for banks to become advisers to REITs in the 1970s only because the Federal
Reserve Board encouraged banks to by-pass the Camp decision. Of course, the
banks have argued that the reason there were so many opportunities for them to
participate as investment advisers in this area is because this is yet another area
where the securities industry has not been providing adequate service for the
American capital markets. They are also seeking legislation that would allow them to
undertake investment advisory/management activities without S.E.C. regulation. It
is unlikely that they will be successful in their attempt to avoid S.E.C. regulation.

6. Regulation of commercial bank securities activities
Regulation is a major issue in the debate over whether to allow commercial
banks to engage in any of the aforementioned securities activities. In other words, if
banks will be deemed eligible to participate in these activities, the question will
become which governmental agencies ought to be given regulatory authority over
them - the banking authorities or the S.E.C.? The banks prefer to remain under
banking authority regulation. The securities industry, on the other hand, believes
that the banking regulation is less demanding than the S.E.C. regulation, and that,
as a result, the banks would obtain a competitive advantage. To assess the validity
of this argument, it is necessary to describe the structure of bank regulation and
then to compare the goals and methods of the bank regulatory agencies with those
of the S.E.C.
6.1. Commercial banking industry regulation
Unlike most businesses, commercial banks have a choice of the agency which
regulates them. Banks can obtain either a national charter or a state charter. Those
that obtain national charters must become members of the Federal Reserve System
and have as their primary regulator the Comptroller of the Currency. Banks
choosing state charters do not have to become Federal Reserve System members.
The Federal Reserve System serves as primary regulator for state member banks,
while the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) serves as primary
regulator for state nonmember banks that elect to obtain F.D.I.C. insurance. All
members of the Federal Reserve System must join the F.D.I.C. Those few state
nonmember banks without F.D.I.C. insurance are exempt from federal regulation and
are primarily regulated by the respective states. Federal Reserve System services are
valuable, therefore most large banks become members. On the other hand, the cost
of membership is high, so many smaller banks opt for state nonmember status. The
result of this multiple regulatory structure is that the banks can shop for the regulator that will best serve their needs. Additionally, in an effort to obtain banks to
regulate, the various agencies allegedly compete for the least restrictive regulation.
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The bank regulation scheme is further complicated by the development of the
bank holding company. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 placed all multibank holding companies under the regulatory control of the Federal Reserve System. In the late 1960s many of the largest banks used one-bank holding companies
to expand into nonbanking activities. These activities were exempt from Federal
Reserve regulation. Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act were enacted
in 1970 to close this loophole and to establish a framework for deciding what were
the appropriate nonbanking activities for bank holding companies. Currently, all
bank holding companies are regulated by the Federal Reserve System, which also
decides which activities are permissible. The criterion used is whether the activity
is "closely related to banking". This is a nebulous standard and the Federal Reserve
System has been most concerned about its effect on the safety of the banking system. Through mid-1974 the number of permissible activities increased rapidly and
banks expanded their nonbanking activities. However, with the collapse of several
large banks, most notably Franklin National Bank, the Federal Reserve System
adopted a more stringent attitude and considerably slowed the regulatory expansion of permissible activities. The Federal Reserve has generally been a conservative
regulator in expansion of bank holding company activity through both acquisition
and de novo entry.
6.2. Commercial bank regulationand securities industry regulation
When analyzing the securities activities of banks, the difference in regulatory
attitudes between the S.E.C. and the bank regulatory agencies must be considered.
The primary concern of the S.E.C. is that investors and prospective investors be
provided with adequate information to make informed investment decisions; to this
end it issues rules for disclosing and reporting information. When the agency finds
that an institution does not follow the required standards, it orders public disclosure of the required information or it takes other forms of publicized enforcement action.
The primary concerns of the bank regulatory agencies are the safety of the
banking system and bank solvency. When a particular regulatory problem arises
with respect to a bank, it is solved privately between the bank and the regulator.
Efforts are made to keep the public uninformed about the problem, since protecting the bank from adverse publicity serves to protect the solvency of the bank
and thus the bank's depositors. At all costs, regulators seek to avoid depositor loss
of confidence in the bank and withdrawal of funds. They recall the experience of
the 1930s, when a run on an individual bank adversely affected the whole banking
system.
The first important areas of difference in regulatory treatment concerns the issue
of disclosure. Since the S.E.C. is principally concerned with the provision of accurate information, it is not surprising to discover that the S.E.C. has more stringent
disclosure requirements than the bank regulatory agencies. Bank holding com-
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panies are not exempt from S.E.C. regulation, and so have been subjected to regulation that the banks themselves are unaccustomed to. An example of this occurred
several years ago when a bank holding company, Chemical New York Corporation,
filed a registration statement for a new stock issue.
The staff of the Commission requested Chemical to amend its prospectus to disclose information relating tothe quality of Chemical's loan portfolio. Specifically, the staff wanted more

information on Chemical's nonincome producing loans for the prior 3 years and more narrative
information on problem loans. After a number of meetings, which produced amendments to
the filing, the revised registration statement was declared effective by the Commission. However, Chemical decided not to go through with the offering and withdrew its registration statement. The Commission has been criticized for having imposed unnecessarily elaborate disclosure on Chemical and for having caused Chemical to determine that it could no longer successfully sell its securities [521.

Another example concerns annual statements. Although commercial banks are
exempt from S.E.C. regulation, the bank regulatory agencies are given the responsibility of administering and enforcing certain sections of the securities laws with
respect to the new issues of bank securities. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, passed in 1974, require the bank regulatory agencies to "issue
substantially similar regulations to regulations and rules issued by the Commission"
unless "not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for protection of
investors". Deviations from the rules must be explained by the bank regulatory
agencies in the Federal Register [531. The bank regulatory agencies do not require
public certification of annual statements because they feel that the regular bank
examination process is sufficient. The Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve Board consider banks to have only one line of business and therefore do
not follow S.E.C. regulations, which require line of business reporting.
The second important area of difference in regulatory treatment concerns the
issue of insider information. Both banks and brokerage firms obtain confidential
information about companies in one department and must advise customers about
these companies in other departments. The S.E.C. would like investors to be fully
informed and so prefer that investor-customers be provided with all available information. The bank regulatory agencies, however, require a separation of departments
(i.e. so-called "Chinese walls"), for example between those that deal with new
issues and those engaged in trading, and so prefer that information not be shared
among the departments. Resolution of this issue in favor of either agency would
conflict with the basic policies of the other agency.
A third area of regulatory disagreement is enforcement and can be illustrated by
two cases. First, when fraud was uncovered in dealings between Westgate California
Corporation and the United States National Bank of San Diego, the S.E.C.
informed the Comptroller that it wanted to make the bank a defendant. The
Comptroller of the Currency objected to this because he feared that the adverse
publicity could cause depositors to withdraw funds from the bank and impair the
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condition of the bank, i.e. cause a "run" on the bank. Secondly, when rumors
about the condition of Franklin National Bank caused a substantial drop in the
price of its stock in 1974, the S.E.C. wanted to suspend trading in the stock. Again,
the Comptroller of the Currency felt that this would not only adversely affect
Franklin but also all banks. Lengthy negotiations between the regulatory agencies
was necessary to determine a course of action [54].
The fourth area of difference concerns proper record-keeping. One S.E.C.
sponsored study has concluded that
records actually maintained by banks are neifler uniform in content nor, in many cases, adequate for examination purposes. To take one example, without adequate time records of the
receipt and entry of orders, banks cannot be effectively examined for promptness of execution or for the existence of fraudulent "kick-back" types of schemes.... f55]
This same study has also criticized the bank examination procedure, asserting that
bank examiners are not knowledgeable about the securities laws. This is of special
concern to the S.E.C. since some of the problems it has had in dealing with banks
are caused by a lack of awareness of the securities laws on the part of bank personnel. Recently, however, with the aid of S.E.C. personnel, bank examiners have been
given some training in securities law.
Still another important area of regulatory difference concerns the issues of
industrial concentration and competition. The bank regulatory agencies have long
been concerned with these issues, and are entrusted with the preservation of competition. The S.E.C., on the other hand, has not been seriously concerned with
structural questions affecting competitive levels and until recently presided over an
industry with administratively fixed prices. If banks are permitted to expand their
activities, especially through the bank holding company, these issues will become
very important. There appears to be great potential for regulatory disagreement.
If Congress decides that banks should be permitted full-scale entry into invest-.
ment banking, it is likely that expansion will occur through acquisitions of existing
investment banking firms by bank holding companies and through establishment of
investment banking subsidiaries by bank holding companies. Primary regulatory
authority for the holding company would reside with the Federal Reserve System
while the S.E.C. would be the prime regulator of the subsidiary. In addition to the
regulatory problems between the Federal Reserve Board and other bank regulators
under existing arrangements where regulatory authority is divided,joint responsibility with the S.E.C., an agency with a vastly different philosophy for regulatory
responsibility, would present even more serious conflicts.
Since 1974, the Federal Reserve Board has become more concerned about the
effect of nonbanking subsidiaries upon a bank and has been much more reluctant to
approve new nonbanking ventures. Questions would arise about the investment
banking subsidiary which have been raised about other nonbanking subsidiaries.
What capital standards would be applied to the investment banking subsidiary? To
what extent would the bank be permitted to support an affiliate in financial diffl-
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culty? The S.E.C. would still maintain some regulatory responsibility over the bank
holding company, but the Commission has had little experience with issues of this
type. In any event, commercial bank entry into investment banking would strain
relations between regulatory agencies and likely would necessitate a restructuring of
regulatory responsibilities.
If banks do expand into investment banking, competitive analysis of the consequences of such entry could become one of the most important areas for the
regulatory agencies. People in the securities industry generally feel that banks
would ha've an unfair competitive advantage over nonbank firms. The Securities
Industry Association asserts that banks have "special advantages and privileges" the
effect of which is to lower the cost of intermediation of funds and thus to lower
the cost of funds to borrowers. ".... [I]t would be patently unfair if nonbanking
entities were forced to compete with banks without the benefit of such privileges"
[56]. To illustrate this point, the industry cites the case of bank entry into mortgage banking in the early 1970s.
That industry is similar to the investment banking industry in that mortgage bankers "underwrite" or inventory mortgages while looking for institutional purchasers. In performing this
function, independent mortgage bankers suffer a distinct disadvantage in competing with mortgage banking firms affiliated with banks. A large expense is the interest cost of holding mort-

gages in inventory, but bank-affiliated firms can finance their inventories with loans from their
affiliated banks. Securities firms are placed at a similar disadvantage in competing with banks
in underwriting general obligation bonds [571.

Although evidence does not support this viewpoint [58], constant surveillance to
reveal potential unfair competition, and measures to stop it should it arise, will
require joint regulatory activity.
Increasing bank involvement in securities-related activities and the prospects for
future involvement are bound to raise issues of regulatory mix and procedures; it
has already led to suggestions to alter the regulatory framework.
Each regulatory agency has sought to maintain or extend its jurisdiction. The
bank regulatory agencies want to maintain their full regulatory powers over the
banks. The S.E.C. has argued for expanded S.E.C. responsibility. For example,
Commissioner Evans of the S.E.C., addressing the Ninth Annual Banking Law
Institute, has stated that ".... you should expect banks either to be prohibited from
engaging in securities activities or for bank securities activities to come under S.E.C.
jurisdiction. I believe it will be the latter. If this occurs, it will not be based on any
Commission desire to expand its jurisdiction, but because it is fair and logical"
[59]. The S.E.C. itself has taken a more moderate view, Le. that bank regulatory
agencies be compelled to act as the S.E.C. would, and for these agencies to consult
with the S.E.C. [60]. The banking authorities in effect would prefer to educate
their examiners to become "security-wise"; i.e. to internalize securities regulation.
Since the best choice of regulatory mode is dependent upon the uncertain future
course of bank involvement in the securities industry, we do not advocate here a
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particular regulatory reform. However, any regulatory arrangement should have as
its basic aim equality of regulation for all market participants. Efficient operation
of the market requires that some firms not be given a regulatory advantage over
others.

7. Conclusion
The overall impression is that in this past decade commercial banks have steadily
encroached on brokerage activities formerly provided only by securities industry
firms. However, the banks have also created new services for which there is no
counterpart in the securities industry. Many of these services would not seem to
conflict with the Glass-Steagall Act; a few of them do appear to violate the intent,
if not the letter, of the Act [61]. This is particularly true in the case of pooled
investment funds and promotion of the sale of shares in those funds to individuals.
Real estate investment trusts have actually led to the very conflict of interest problems that the Glass-Steagall Act sought to prevent.
The argument from the viewpoint of the public welfare that underwriting
revenue bonds ought to be permitted to commercial banks is stronger than the argument that commercial banks be granted explicit permission to handle corporate
private placements. That is to say, to the two financial industries and their
customers and to the economy as a whole the risks and hazards are probably greater
from private placements than from underwriting revenue bonds or the expected
rewards smaller from bank entry into private placements than from entry into underwriting revenue bonds. Despite this, commercial banks are doing private placements and are not doing revenue bond underwritings.
If our general findings with respect to potential risk are supported, it is both
logical and likely that the Glass-Steagall Act be amended to provide:
(1) specific allowance of revenue bond underwriting, subject to equal regulation
and taxation, and
(2) specific disallowance of private placement activity unless certain conditions
are met: (a) absence of specific conflict of interest conditions; (b) presence of equal
competitive conditions and equal regulatory constraints (i.e. equivalent to the
securities industry); and (c) revision of deposit insurance plans to ensure that the
increased risks are imposed on depositors by scaling the premium according to line
of activity, rather than according to deposit size, as is presently done.
The revision of deposit insurance plans will certainly require that, in addition to
supervision of existing specialized regulatory agencies, there be supervision by the
S.E.C. and the Department of Justice of all the banks' securities activities, just as
investment bankers and brokerage firms would be required to subject themselves to
banking authority if they entered the deposit banking business (and insurance
regulators if they entered the annuity business). Depositors are entitled to insulation from risk, or to increased return if increased risks are approved.
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(3) Reaffirmation and clarification of the banks' power to provide brokerage
services upon order of their customers, subject, of course, to equal regulation, i.e.
subject to regulation under the Securities Act in their capacity as brokers.
If these precautionary measures cannot be taken, banks (whether directly or
through affiliates) shbuld continue to be excluded from revenue bond underwriting
and excluded from further corporate securities placement, or from mass brokerage,
activity. Banks do seem willing however to accept S.E.C. and other securities
industry regulations with respect to these activities.
It is most likely and desirable that the outcome of the debate be the maintenance
of separate but overlapping and competing financial institutions. However, if the
separate but overlapping structure is to be fairly and effectively competitive in
supplying funds to the economy, regulation will have to be equalized. Equalizing
regulation of the competitive and complementary intersection of two industries
will not be an easy task, since the regulatory structures, goals, and methods are very
different. Commercial banks are regulated at various state/federal levels by authorities whose principal purpose is to ensure the solvency and stability of each bank in
its community. The banking authorities maintain close ties with the institutions
they regulate and protect the bank customers by means of periodic and confidential
examination of each bank under their supervision. Securities firms are largely selfregulating; but the S.E.C. superimposes its own regulations so as to ensure adequate
disclosure and to prevent fraudulent practices in the securities markets. The S.E.C.'s
supervision is not company-oriented, but market-oriented; as a result, its relationships with securities firms is not close. The S.E.C. specifies rules of behavior and
checks up on the securities industry by means of analysis of market behavior and
self-regulatory organizations.
The need to expand regulation of banks' securities activities should not be
underestimated. It pervades every argument made in defense of banks' rights to
compete fairly. For example, to keep bank conflicts of interest from damaging the
unsophisticated, S.E.C. disclosure-type rules and enforcement are required. Another
example is that in order to offset the increased riskiness of banks doing securities
business, the depositors and the community will require variable or indexed deposit
insurance, and perhaps some direct relationship to S.I.P.C. [62]. Or deposit
insurance will have to be keyed to a set of rules and regulations that in turn are
specified in accordance with the various risks of various lines of securities business
activity. A final example: to require banking affiliates to be used to insulate risky
securities activities from the banks proper may reduce bank risk, but it stimulates
conflict of inteiest; to require the securities activities to be consolidated within the
bank will require that bank regulations be supplemented by disclosure-oriented
security regulators, and parallel changes in deposit insurance mechanisms [63].
In the absence of equal regulation of joint securities activities, competition is
necessarily unfair, concentration more likely, and conflicts of interest more prevalent.
The likelihood of legislative reform must be viewed in the context of the fact
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that it is very difficult to set clear-cut limits or to separate powers, purposes, and
functions meticulously and for all time. Continuous and rapid changes in the
financial markets and in technology tend to modify existing financial market structures and set their own competitive frontiers. This is so for two reasons. First,
financial institutions respond more quickly and effectively to market changes than
does the legislature. Legislative response requires a political consensus among
competitors that is difficult to obtain. Generally speaking, consensus tends to
emerge only at those times when general anxiety and uncertainty overwhelm the
more parochial concern of relative competitive advantage. Secondly, the character
of market pressures or innovation. is not easy to predict. For instance, it was difficult at the beginning of the last decade to foresee the increasing importance of overseas operations of American commercial banks and the increasing competition from
foreign banks' operations in the United States.
There is pressure for legislative reform, especially because of the spread of
American banks abroad and vice versa. Until recently foreign banks operating
within the U.S. were subject only to state, not to federal, banking laws. Although
the International Banking Act of 1978 deals with these matters, there remains a
need to equalize competition for the purely domestic state banks. In addition,
American banks abroad, subject to federal jurisdiction, have opportunities to serve
an important role in syndicating Euro-currency loans, a true investment banking
activity, often for corporate customers, involving both best efforts and firm commitment underwritings. The securities industry itself may also press for legislative
reform because of increasing inroads which the banks are making into its business.
At the present time the securities industry is having difficulty resisting the banks. It
is in a weakened condition because there are competitive brokerage fees, regional
banking firms are aggressively entering into the profitable negotiated revenue bond
business, and the S.E.C. is pressing for flexible underwriting terms. The securities
industry may well come to prefer risking a full Congressional review of Glass-Steagall to piecemeal expansion by the banking industry into securities activities.
On the other hand it may be that if full-scale commercial bank entry into the
securities industry requires additional capital, insurance, or- tax increases, and
regulatory supervision, and further, if securities firms feel compelled in response to
enter the commercial banking industry, the commercial banks as a whole (if not the
giants) may well beat a hasty retreat.
Table I contains projections concerning twenty-four types of securities activity
that commercial banks are concerned with. The securities industry has usually
reacted to these competitive threats by challenging the right of the banks to
conduct the given activity. With respect to those services which the industry has not
previously supplied, we believe that this strategy is unwise. This is especially so in
those cases where the industry has not as yet offered comparable services. Furthermore, the securities industry reputedly does not have sufficient political clout or
lobbying resources to get its way in Congress. The banks, on the other hand, despite
a great deal of clout and lobbying resources, have not succeeded in getting permissive bills out of committee.
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Table I
Status of bank direct competition with the securities industry
Type of activity

Dominant
supplier a

1. Registrar and transfer agent
2. Extension of credit on securities
3. Dividend-paying agent
4. Bond trustee and agent
S. Government bond dealers
6. Dividend reinvestment plans
7. Automatic customer purchase plans
8. Agency portfolio management for
individuals
9. Keogh and IRA individual plans
10. Keogh and IRA pooled investments
plans
1 1. Personal trust activity
12. Commingled agency accounts
13. Investment company advisers
14. Closed-end fund sponsor
15. Open-end fund sponsor
16. REIT adviser
17. Employee stock purchase plans
18. Employee pension funds: separate
19. Employee pension funds: commingled
20. Private placement advice
21. Lease financing pools
22. Mergers and acquisitions service
23. Long-term financing
24. Overseas investment banking

Profitability b

GlassSteagall
status C

Projected
status d

P
P

C
C

B
B

Note: Banks currently engage in all of the above activities except 12 and 15.
a) Dominant supplier:
B = banks; S = securities industry; E = both in significant amounts.
b) Profitability of activity:
P = profitable; U = unprofitable; M = marginal.
c) Status under Glass-Steagall Act:
L = apparently legal and unchallenged;
C = currently legal but challenged by securities industry;
I = currently illegal for banks.
d) Projected status of activity:
B = banks will gain right to offer this service without direct S.E.C. supervision (or already
have the right);
BS = banks will offer this service with some S.E.C. supervision;
X = banks will be excluded from providing this service.
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Given the extent of structural shifts in the securities business since 1933, it is

likely that Congress will alter the banking laws. Between 1933 and 1979, municipal
bonds (largely by means of revenue bond variants) have become as important as
corporate bonds in the underwriting business; institutional purchasers, along with
their preferences for private placements have come to dominate the industry; and
the rise of pension funds, mutual funds, and other portfolio purchases by individuals at the cost of sharply diminished purchases (picking) of individual security
issues is the new heart of the brokerage wing of the securities industry. At the very
least, the Glass-Steagall Act will be reviewed to determine whether and how the
separation of commercial banking and investment banks should be maintained given
these sizable structural changes in the securities industry (and in its rules and regulations as well) that have occurred since the Act was enacted into law.
Legislative inertia, a crowded calendar, the influence of the contending lobbies,
and the very real difficulties inherent in devising equal legislation may cause
Congress to postpone (1) formal hearings and (2) actual passage even if some
hearings are held until after interested parties have themselves tried to resolve their
differences. The real unknown is how much time the Congress will allow for the
industries and their regulators to resolve the issues between them. In the meantime,
the issues themselves could change since the recent rapid pace of structural change
in the finance industries is unlikely to slow down.
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respect to general obligation bonds than with revenue bonds, at least insofar as these are issued
by municipalities.
[33] See Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Municipal Bond Market, Building a
Broader Market (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976).,
[341 Letter from Howard T. Sprow, Vice President and General Counsel of Merrill Lynch,
to Sen. Harrison Williams (Feb. 17, 1976).
[35] Securities and Exchange Comrniission, Report on Bank Securities Activities of the
S.E.C., Submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter cited as S.E.C. Bank Study] at 483-529.
[36] For the terms of a typical bank dividend reinvestment plan see Citibank Dividend
Reinvestment Services (Citibank, N.Y.) (1978).
[37] In the early 1970s the American Telephone and Telegraph Company began offering al
original issue dividend reinvestment plan. Instead of using the funds to purchase already outstanding stock for participants, the funds were retained by AT & T and new shares issued.
Several months of negotiation with the S.E.C. were required before the plan was allowed. The
negotiations mostly related to how often and how elaborate a prospectus must be sent to a
participant. The rules worked out were similar to the rules for the mutual fund industry. Now
more than forty firms have developed original issue plans and hundreds of millions of dollars
annually are being raised this way.
[38] S.E.C. Bank Study, op. cit. supra n. 35, at 36-53.
[39] Id. at 51-52.
[40] At present about twenty banks are offering such plans. One group uses Investment
Data Corporation as a service sub-contractor for preparing individual statements (but each bank
handles its own securities transactions) and another group uses The First National Bank of
Chicago (which handles transactions and some of the statement preparation). Thus, there are
really only two banking agents offering the service. Id. at 54-101.
[41] Id. at 421-540.
[42] 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
[43] Securities Industry Association, Memorandum for Study and Discussion on Bank
Securities Activities, reprintedin S.E.C. Bank Study, op. cit. supra n. 35, at 42.
[44] Federal Reserve Board Staff Study, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activities
(June 1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 P.P. Report] at 58-59.
[451 Stanford Research Institute, Outlook for the U.S. Securities Industry (1977).
[461 1977 P.P. Report, op. cit. supra n. 44, at 65-66.
[47] Id. at 41.
[48] U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Public Policy Aspects of Bank Securities Activities: Al
Issues Paper (Nov. 1975), Appendix at 1-25.
[49] See id., at 65, 79.
[50] See S.E.C. Bank Study, op. cit. supra n. 35, at 426-30, 447-55.
[511 Silver, Statement of the Investment Company Institute Before the Sen. Committee on
Banking (June 1978) at 19-31.
[52] Greenberg, Banks and the Federal Securities Laws: Some Recent Developlments, 49
S. Calif. L.R. 665 (645-1458, 1976) at 695.
[531 15 U.S.C. § 781 (i) (1-976).
[54] See Greenberg, op. cit. supra n. 52, at 706-8.
[55] Spencer, Jr., Regulation of Bank SecuritiesActivities: The Effects of the S.E.C. Bank
Study, 95 Banking L.J. 616 (Aug.-Dec. 1978) at 625.
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[561 Securities Industry Association, Bank Securities Activities: Memorandum for Study
and Discussion, 14 San Diego L.R. 751 (751-1303, 1977) at 779.
[571 Id. at 780.
[581 Banks entering mortgage banking and consumer finance have not been more profitable
or faster growing than the independent firms. See Talley, Bank Holding Company Performance
in Consumer Finance and Mortgage Banking, Bank Ad. (July 1, 1976) at 44; and Rhoades, The
Effect of Bank-Holding-Company Acquisitions of Mortgage Bankers on Mortgage Lending
Activity, 48 J. Bus. 344 (Univ. Chicago Press, 1975) at 347.
[591 Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 Banking L.J. 611 (Aug.-Dec.
1974) at 619.
[601 Report on Bank Securities Activities of the S.E.C., printed for use of the Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Aug. 1977) at 272-288,401-418.
[611 See McConnell, Why Not Give Banks a Wider Role in the CapitalMarkets? Banking
(Jan. 1975) at 32-33.
[621 Securities Investor Protection Corporation (a Government corporation) covers individual customers by S 100,000 at this writing (late 1979) of which S 40,000 can be in cash. See
U.S.C. § 78 ccc (1976).
[631 Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectives on the
Glass-Steagall Act, in The Deregulation of the Banking and Securities Industries (Goldberg and
White eds. 1979) at 273.
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